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Abstract
Given a block cipher of length L Cook’s elastic cipher allows to en-
crypt messages of variable length from L to 2L. Given some conditions
on the key schedule, Cook’s elastic cipher is secure against any key re-
covery attack if the underlying block cipher is, and it achieves complete
diffusion in at most q+1 rounds if the underlying block cipher achieves
it in q rounds. We extend Cook’s construction inductively, obtaining
the first elastic cipher for any message length greater than L with the
same properties of security as Cook’s elastic cipher, and whose com-
plexity of the encryption/decryption grows polynomially with the size
of the message.
Keywords: variable length block cipher, elastic cipher, Cook.
1 Introduction
To overcome the computational and space overheads arising from plaintext-
padding techniques and some disadvantages of ciphertext stealing [15] (such
as altering how the mode is applied to the last two blocks and the need
of decrypting the last block before the next-to-last block), variable input
length block ciphers have been introduced in the past [3, 13]. Some work
has been done on variable-length pseudorandom functions. The focus went
from variable-length inputs with fixed length output as applicable to MACs
and hash functions, [1, 2, 4, 5] to modes that work on multiples of the origi-
nal block length [11, 12]. There have also been ad-hoc attempts to design a
variable-length block cipher from scratch [14, 16].
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All mentioned proposals for converting existing block ciphers into variable-
length ones focused on treating a block cipher as a black box and combining
it with other operations in what amounts to a mode of encryption. While
such an approach allows the security of the variable-length block cipher to be
defined in terms of the original block cipher, the resulting constructions re-
quire multiple applications of the original block cipher, making them compu-
tationally inefficient compared to padding. These methods may be valuable
in providing modes of encryption that preserve the length of the data but
they do not address how to design block ciphers to support variable-length
blocks. Thus the concept of an elastic cipher has been introduced by Cook
et al. in [6, 7, 8, 10]. Built on an existing block cipher, they provide a vari-
able input length cipher whose length can be extended up to two times the
original block cipher length. To gain efficiency, the design of such a cipher
exploits existing components of a cipher (e.g. the internal round) threating
them as a black box. To prove security they show that the elastic version of
a block cipher is secure against attacks that attempt to recover key bits if
the original, fixed-length version of the cipher is secure against such attacks.
Their method is unique in that they show how to convert such an attack
on the elastic version directly into an attack on the original version with a
polynomially related time complexity.
The elastic construction allows also for new modes of encryption [9, §3].
Here we provide an extension of Cook’s elastic cipher, providing a still ef-
ficient construction with input of any length, offering the same security of
the underlying block cipher. An advantage of such a solution is that when
encrypting two identical and concatenated plaintexts of length twice the un-
derlying block cipher size, the resulting ciphertext appears as a completely
random string, instead of two identical concatenated random string. In fact,
our construction can also be seen as an efficient mode of operation itself.
We present here our extension of Cook’s elastic block cipher. Her exten-
sion E1 allows to construct an elastic cipher of length from L to 2L, where
L is the message length of the fixed input length block cipher E0. We start
from E1 and apply the elastic extension to E1 itself, obtaining E2 and we
relate its security against key recovery attacks to that of E1, and we repeat
the process to build iteratively an elastic extension En of E0 which takes
inputs of length 2n−1L up to 2nL.
Section 2 gives a brief description of Cook’s idea recalling which are the key
schedule requirements. Section 3 describes our extension, showing the al-
gorithm to encrypt a plaintext of length 2n−1L + y, with 0 ≤ y ≤ 2n−1L.
Section 4 is devoted to the security of En, first analyzing how the extension
exploits the diffusion properties of the round function of E0, and second giv-
ing a proof of how the security against key recovery attack of En is reduced
to that of E0. This is achieved following and extending Cook’s proof for E1.
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2 Cook’s elastic cipher
2.1 Preliminaries
Let n ∈ N, n ≥ 1. Let {0, 1}≥n denote the set of all binary strings with
length at least n. The function l(M) denotes the length of the string M .
A message/plaintext space M is a nonempty subset of {0, 1}≥n for which
M ∈ M implies that M ′ ∈ M for all M ′ of the same length of M . A
ciphertext space (or range) C is a nonempty subset of {0, 1}≥n. From now
on, C =M. A key space K is a nonempty set together with a probability
measure on that set. A pseudorandom permutation (PRP) with key space
K, message space M and range C is a set of permutations F = {FK |
K ∈ K} where each FK : M → C. We usually write F : K ×M → C.
We assume that l(FK(M)) depends only on l(M). A variable input length
(VIL) cipher is a PRP F : K ×M →M. A block-cipher round (or simply
a round) is a key-dependent permutation of the message/ciphertext space,
precisely R : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. As usual we can consider {0, 1}n to
denote the vector space (F2)
n. The number n is called the block length. We
consider rounds made of a round function (which is an invertible vectorial
Boolean function indicated with the letter C, and that may be applied to
just some of the round input bits, as in DES), followed by an affine map
and a sum in (F2)
n with the round key. A block-cipher (BC) is a cipher
F : K×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n obtained from the composition of r rounds, whose
keys are generated from the cipher key k ∈ K by a key schedule. We write
F (k, x) = R0(k0(k), x0) ◦ ... ◦Rr(kr(k), xr) with x ∈ M and k ∈ K.
2.2 Description of the elastic cipher
Call E0 a block cipher with input length L, composed by r0 rounds,
where the ith round is indicated by R0i, with i = 0, . . . , r0 − 1.
Definition 1. The cycle C0 of the block cipher E0 is a vectorial Boolean
function made of the least, over any key, number (called length) of consec-
utive rounds such that each bit of the cycle output is a function of at least
two input bits. 1
Remark 1. Note that the cycle of a block cipher has been defined in [6] as the
sequence of steps in which all bits have been processed by the round function
R0.
We consider only ciphers that can be divided in cycles of the same
length. Suppose E0 has c0 cycles, and let C0j be E0 jth cycle function
(j = 1, . . . , r0/x where x is the number of rounds per cycle). Consider only
block ciphers whose round function has a whitening as last operation (this
1E.g., AES cycle coincides with its round; DES cycle is the composition of two consec-
utive round.
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is very common in real ciphers such as AES, Serpent DES, ...).
The whitenings after the cycles can be incorporated and extended to the full
input length when applying the last whitening in the last round inside each
cycle.
E0 has r0 = c0 · x rounds.
The elastic version of E0, which we call E1, is widely described in [10] with
some different notations. We can define now E1, the elastic extension of E0
Definition 2. 2 An elastic cipher E1 of E0 is a VIL cipher with message
space {0, 1}L+y with 0 ≤ y ≤ L, constructed from E0 as follows:
• the number of rounds of E1 is r1 = c0 + ⌈c0 · y/L⌉
• E1’s ith round R1i has one E0’s cycle as round function, whose input
are the leftmost L bits and whose last sum with the key is expanded
to the rightmost y bit string T that is not input into the E0 cycle; the
round function C0j is followed by a swap and a xor operation:
1. call R the rightmost y bit string which is the bit-wise sum of T
with y key bits.
2. choose a y bit string S from the output of the cycle and let its
bits be the rightmost ones of R1i output;
3. replace S with S ⊕ T
• add an initial and final whitening
• add an initial and final key-dependent permutation (as in [7, page 24])
between the initial and final whitening and the rounds.
2.3 The choice of the number of rounds in E1
The choice of r1 helps us implementing the extension later. In E0 we
have, by its definition, that to encrypt L bits safely, they have to be influent
in c0 cycles, where the expression influent in a cycle means that a change
in a bit of the input of E0 may imply some changes in the output bits of
that cycle, or said with other words, a input bit is influent in a cycle if it
influences some bits of the output (a input bit influences an output bit if
changing its value while keeping all other input bits fixed, implies a change
in the output bit with probability greater than zero, taking the probability
over all possible input values [10, page 6]). When we add some extra bits to
the input, say y, and we apply the function C0 to the L + y bit string, we
have y bits not influencing the cycle. So, in the next cycle, we “mix” the y
bits left out with the input of the second cycle by xoring them, and letting
out some other y bits. The problem now is that we will have some other y
2The construction in Def.2 is given by Cook [6].
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bits remaining out of the cycle. So, if we have c0 cycles in E0, and we only
do the trick of xoring bits to new inputs, at the end of c0 cycles we will have
c0 · y bits which have not been influent in some of the cycles. So we need to
add c0 · y/L round to our construction.
2.4 Key schedule requirements for the elastic cipher
We give three requirements for the key schedule taken from [6, page 153]
which can be satisfied if we use a pseudorandom generator (e.g. RC4 as in
[10, page 24]):
1. the key schedule should be a stand-alone algorithm that is usable to any
BC;
2. the expanded-key bits should be (or as close to) pseudorandom (as prac-
tical);
3. the expanded-key rate for elastic block cipher should be a small multiple
of the key expansion rate of a standard BC.
3 Extension of the elastic cipher
3.1 Our proposal
Our proposal is to consider an elastic cipher E1 working with fixed length
messages (as it was a block cipher), and apply iteratively the elastic extension
to it. We can define a cycle of an elastic cipher exactly as a cycle for a block
cipher:
Definition 3. The cycle C1i of an elastic cipher E1, with i = 0, . . . , r1/2−1,
is a vectorial Boolean function made of the least, over any key, number of
consecutive E1’s rounds such that each bit of C1i output is a function at
least two input bits.
Now we are ready to construct E2, E3, ..., En, simply by iterating the
previous process. The first round function of E2 looks like Fig.1, whose
notation is explained in the following lines:
• the subscripts A,B, Y indicate respectively the L leftmost, the L sec-
ond leftmost and the Y rightmost bits of the input P or of the key
K.
• Rki is the round function of Ek used in round i of Ek.
• Cki is the cycle function of Ek used as round function in round i of
Ek+1.
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Figure 1: Details of the first round of E2.
• KX is a portion of bits of the key K, where X = [i, . . . , j] indicates a
set of indexes. In Fig.1 we have: A = [0, . . . , L−1], B = [L, . . . , 2L−1],
Y = [2L, . . . , 2L+ y − 1].
• P iA is the portion A of the input of the i+ 1th round, or equivalently
the output of the ith round. Similarly for P iB and P
i
Y .
3.1.1 Some terminology
Call En an elastic cipher of E0 of level n. The integer n is also called the
level of the extension En. En is able to encrypt blocks from length 2
n−1L to
2nL. We call Rn and Cn respectively the round and the cycle functions of
En. The integers rn and cn indicates respectively the number of round and
cycles in En, while rm/En with n > m, indicates the number of rounds of
Em used in En.
Remark 2. The level increases by 1 when the message length doubles, and in
general the level increases by k when the length passes from 2nL to 2n+kL,
which means the level increases logarithmically in respect to the message
length.
Remark 3. Once n is fixed, only En takes variable inputs and has initial and
final key-dependent permutations, all other Ei, with i < n, take as input
messages of fixed length 2iL and do not have initial and final key-dependent
permutation.
3.2 Elastic cipher extension of level n
Here we give explicitly the steps to encrypt a message of any length
greater than L using an extended elastic cipher of a certain level, obtained
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from a FIL block cipher E0 that works on messages of length L. This al-
gorithms are the definition of En. Furthermore we give some theorems to
justify the formulas used. We divide the encrypting algorithm in two parts:
initialization of En and encryption step. For brevity, in this article, we will
omit the algorithm for decryption and CycleFunction−1.
3.2.1 Initialization of En
The initialization of En is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Initialization of En. We get a message P as input and return
the parameters needed to encrypt P .
The following algorithm initializes the elastic cipher En, given a message P
of given length.
INPUT: P .
OUTPUT: the level n, the exponent y, the number of rounds rn, l(K), the key
length, K a random vector of length l(K).
1. Determine the level n of the elastic extension as the least power of 2 such
that 2nL ≥ l(P )
2. Determine y = l(P )− 2n−1L // l is the length function.
3. Determine rn = c0 + ⌈c0
y
2n−1L⌉
3
4. Determine the key K:
Determine the key length: // (see Th.2)
l(K) = {y + 2n−1[L · (n− 1) + lKR(0) · x]} · rn + 2
nL+ 2y +Kperm
Fill a l(K) string with random bits // e.g. using a pseudorandom gen-
erator
3.2.2 Encryption function En
The steps to encrypt a message P with En initialized are described in
Algorithm 2.
3.2.3 CycleFuntion(M,m)
The cycle of Em, used in the encryption function, is described in Algo-
rithm 3.
3.2.4 On the number of rounds and key length
Notice that rn does not represent the number of rounds of level m in En,
but the number of rounds of level n in En. To know how many times the
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Algorithm 2 Encryption function
INPUT: P,K, y, n, rn.
OUTPUT: P encrypted.
1. k = 0 // k is a pointer to the first bit not used of the key.
2. P = P ⊕K[k,...,k+2n−1L+y−1] //Initial whitening
3. k = k + 2n−1L+ y
4. P = perm(P,K[k,...,k+l(Kperm)−1]) //Key dependent permutation, [7, p. 24].
5. k = k + l(Kperm) // move the pointer k.
6. j = 0
7. FOR i = 0, . . . , rn − 1
(a) P[0,...,2n−1L−1] = CycleFunction(P[0,...,2n−1L−1], n−1) // cycle of En−1
(b) P[2n−1L,...,2n−1L+y−1] = P[2n−1L,...,2n−1L+y−1]⊕K[k,...,k+y−1] //Add key
(c) k = k + y
(d) T[0,...,y−1] = P[j,...,j+y−1] //T is a temporary value for the swap steps
(e) P[j,...,j+y−1] = P[j,...,j+y−1] ⊕ P[2n−1L,...,2n−1L+y−1]
4
(f) P[2n−1L,...,2n−1L+y−1] = T[0,...,y−1] // (d)-(e)-(f) are the swap/xor steps.
(g) j = j + 1 mod 2n−1L
8. P = perm(P,K[k,...,k+l(Kperm)−1])
9. k = k + l(Kperm)
10. P = P ⊕K[k,...,k+2n−1L+y−1]
11. RETURN P
cycle function (or equivalently the round function) of Em is used in En, then
we need the following:
Theorem 1 (Number of Rounds Rm in En). The number rm,n of rounds of
level m in En is:
rm/En = rn · 2
n−m . (1)
In particular5 if m = 0:
r0/En = rn · 2
n−1 · x ≤ r0 · 2
n−1 · x . (2)
Proof. This is because one round of En contains one cycle of En−1, which is
made of two rounds of En−1(plus a whitening and a swap), and each of them
contains 2 rounds of En−2(plus a whitening and a swap), and so on; until
5The number of rounds of level 0 used in the elastic increases exponentially with n,
which means polynomially (in our case linearly) with the input length 2nL.
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Algorithm 3 CycleFuntion(M,m).
INPUT: the bit string M , the level m of the cycle function (M has length 2mL).
OUTPUT: the 2mL bit string M processed by CycleFunction.
1. IF m = 0 THEN
(a) FOR i = 1, . . . , x DO
i. M = R0(M,Kk,...,k+lKR (0)−1)
ii. k = k + lKR(0)
(b) RETURN M
2. IF m > 0 THEN
(a) A = M[0,...,2m−1L−1]
(b) B = M[2m−1L,...,2mL−1]
(c) FOR i = 1, 2 DO
i. A = CycleFunction(A,m− 1)
ii. B = B ⊕K[k,...,k+2mL−1]
iii. k = k + 2mL
iv. T = A
v. A = A⊕B
vi. B = T
(d) RETURN A||B
one round of E1 is made of x rounds of E0(plus a whitening and a swap). In
formulas:
r0/En = rn · 2
n−1 · x =
= cn−1 + ⌈cn−1
y
2n−1L
⌉2n−1 · x ≤
≤ 2 · c0 · 2
n−1 · x =
= c0 · 2
n · x =
= r0 · 2
n−1 · x .
The following theorem, beside giving an explicit formula for the key bits
needed for encryption shows that Cook’s third requirement for the key sched-
ule is satisfied because the key expansion rate grows polynomially with the
input length. Let’s call lKC (n) the function that gives the number of bits
needed for the key of the cycle of level n, or simply the key length of cycle
Cn.
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Theorem 2 (Key Length). If we consider En with initial and final whitening
and key-dependent permutation, the number of bits needed as key bits is:
l(K) = {y + 2n−1[L · (n− 1) + lKR(0) · x]} · rn + 2
nL+ 2y +Kperm . (3)
Proof. Notice that if our extended cipher is of level n, then our function is
defined only for level < n, because those are the ones with fixed input length.
The function may be defined recursively in the following way:
lKC (n) =
{
2nL+ 2lKC (n− 1) if n > 0
lKC (0) = lKR(0) · x if n = 0
(4)
We are now ready to prove the formula. We see that for each cycle key we
need y bits for “extra” whitening and lKC (n−1) bits. Considering also initial
and final whitenings and key-dependent permutations we have:
l(K) = [y + lKC (n− 1)+] · rn + 2(2
n−1L+ y) +Kperm . (5)
If we write lKC (n− 1) in a compact form we obtain:
lKC (n− 1) = 2
nL+ 2lKC (n− 2) =
= 2nL+ 2(2n−1L+ 2lKC (n − 3)) =
= 2nL+ 2nL+ 22lKC (n− 3) =
= . . . =
= 2nL+ ...+ 2nL︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
times + 2n−1·lKC (0) =
= 2n−1L(n− 1) + 2n−1 · lKR(0) · x =
= 2n−1[L · (n− 1) + lKR(0) · x] .
4 Security of the elastic cipher extension
4.1 Diffusion
We recall that if every input bit to a b-bit block cipher influences the value
in all b bits after q rounds, then the block cipher is said to have complete
diffusion in q rounds. Complete diffusion does not imply security and is not
the same as diffusion in an ideal block cipher where changing a single bit of
input will cause each individual bit of output to change with 1/2 probability.
We refer to this case as ideal diffusion. In complete diffusion, the probability
each individual bit of output changes must only be > 0% and may be 100%.
In her paper, [7, page 8], Cook shows that if complete diffusion occurs after
q cycles in E0 (the fixed length block cipher), then it occurs after at most
q + 1 rounds in E1 (the elastic version of E0). It is possible to extend this
proof for En.
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Theorem 3 (Complete Diffusion). If complete diffusion occurs after q cycles
in En−1 (an elastic cipher working with length message 2
n−1L), then it occurs
after at most q + 1 rounds in En(the elastic version of En−1).
Proof. According to [7, page 6], complete diffusion is achieved in q rounds
if every single bit input to a l-bit block cipher influences the value in all l
bits after q rounds, where we say that a q rounds input bit bi influences a q
rounds output bit bj if changing bi, while holding all other l − 1 input bits
constant, causes bj to change with probability > 0, when the probability is
taken over all possible values of other input bits and the key bits are held
constant.
First notice that whitening does not impact diffusion, so, for the purposes
of our proof, we can view the elastic expansion without them.
We can see that each of the first 2n−1 input bits bj that influences a bit in
position j of the output of Cn−1 will influence one (or more) bit in position
j of the output of Rn, and if bi influences a bit xored after the cycle, then
bi will also influence a output bit of Rn in position between 2
n−1L and
2n−1L+ y − 1.
So, if we have complete diffusion in En−1 after q rounds, then, in En, the
first 2n−1L input bits will keep influencing all 2nL + y output bits after q
rounds.
In En, the rightmost y bits of the input do not influence the first cycle,
but because of the swap step they influence the second cycle and since then
they will influence all the cycles and will reach complete diffusion after q+1
cycles. Figure 2 shows the situation.
4.1.1 On diffusion probabilities and ideal diffusion
We now illustrate how the elastic expansion impacts on the probabilities
that a bit of the output of a round function changes, given that one input
bit changed while keeping all other input bits fixed, and with constant key
bits.
It is possible to generalize the previous theorem also in the case of ideal
diffusion.
Theorem 4 (Ideal Diffusion). If ideal diffusion occurs after q cycles in En−1
(an elastic cipher working with length message 2n−1L), then it occurs after
at most q + 1 rounds in En(the elastic version of En−1).
Proof. Consider a black box f that works with a L bit string (which repre-
sents our cycle function). We call the input bit string P in and the output
bit string P out, and we denote a single input bit (in position i) P ini and a
single output bit (in position j) P outi , where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ L− 1. Consider the
following experiment A:
1. Initialize four counters n00 = 0, n01 = 0, n10 = 0, n11 = 0.
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Figure 2: One-Bit Diffusion in the Elastic Network.
2. Choose position i, j for an input bit P ini and an output bit P
out
j .
3. Fix all other input bit to some value.
4. Fix P ini = 0, calculate f(P
in) and take note of the value assumed by P outj .
5. Fix P ini = 1, calculate f(P
in) and take note of the value assumed by P outj .
6. If P outj was equal to 0 both in point 4 and 5 then n00 = n00 + 1.
If P outj was equal to 0 both in point 4 and 5 then n11 = n11 + 1.
If P outj was equal to 0 in point 4 and to 1 in point 5 then n01 = n01 + 1.
If P outj was equal to 1 in point 4 and to 0 in point 5 then n10 = n10 + 1.
7. Repeat the experiment for all other 2L−1 possible values of the input.
Denote the number of times we had a change in the bit P outj with nc =
n01 + n10, and denote the number of times the value in jth position re-
mained equal with ne = 2
L−1 − nc = n00 + n11.
At the end of the experiment, changing the bit in position of the input
produces a change in the bit in position j of the output with probability
pc =
nc
2L−1
and it does not produce a change with probability pe =
ne
2L−1
.
The ideal situation for a cycle function is when n00 = n11 = n01 = n10 =
2L−1
4 .
Now consider a second experiment B, where we have the same black box f
as in experiment A, and where we add some new steps, which are the elastic
steps that influence diffusion, namely the xor and swap steps, see in Fig. 3
(0 ≤ k < y). Now the input bit string has L+ y bits.
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⊕
f
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k+2L−1
P out
k+2L−1P
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j = f(P
in
i ) + P
in
k+2L−1
Figure 3: One-Bit Diffusion in One Round.
We want to repeat the experiment with this new scheme to see how the
elastic expansion acts on the probability of a change in one single output bit
given a variation in one single input bit.
First consider the output of f . We observe that repeating the experi-
ment 2L+y−1 times the output string right after the black box 6 will give
nBrs = n
A
rs · 2
y, where nXrs denotes the number of times the jth output bit
passed from r to s in the experiment X, with r, s ∈ {0, 1}. This is because
we are actually repeating the experiment A 2y times, with the leftmost y bits
not influencing the function f . This gives that pBc =
nBc
2L+y−1
=
nB01+n
B
10
2L+y−1
=
nA
01
2y+nA
10
2y
2L+y−1
=
nA
01
+nA
10
2L−1
= pAc .
Now consider the output of the entire experiments. Because last y bits do
not influence the black box function, they do not influence the part of the
final output of the experiment B that does not come from the output of the
last xor. So we are interested in analyzing the bits of the output in those
position j influenced by the xor step.
Through the entire experiment B, the bit f(P ini ) will be xored half of the
times with 0 and half of the times with 1 (which come from the rightmost
y bits). This means that if we counted, for instance, nA00 · 2
y times for the
jth output bit of f not changing from 0, after the xor we will count
nA
00
·2y
2
times for the jth output bit of the xor not changing from 0. With the same
reasoning we obtain the following scheme:
nB00 = (
nA00
2
+
nA01
2
)2y, nB11 = (
nA11
2
+
nA10
2
)2y,
nB01 = (
nA01
2
+
nA00
2
)2y , nB10 = (
nA10
2
+
nA11
2
)2y (6)
The probability a bit of the output (in position j) changed given a change
of one bit in the input (in position i) is:
pB =
nB01 + n
B
10
2L+y−1
=
(
nA
01
2 +
nA
00
2 )2
y + (
nA
10
2 +
nA
11
2 )2
y
2L+y−1
=
1
2
·
nAe + n
A
c
2L−1
=
1
2
(7)
6we will refer to it as f(P ini ), and f(P
in
i )j will indicate its jth bit
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And similarly qBc = 1/2.
This means that P outj (when j is a position included between the positions
coming from the xor output) changes with probability pB = 50%, given a
variation of P ini .
Reasoning as in Theorem 3, and with the last results, we proved the theorem.
Note 1. The fact that after the xor each bit changes with probability 1/2
may be exploited as a weakness, because an adversary could distinguish a
block cipher from the elastic cipher if the elastic round function R0 does not
achieve ideal diffusion; it would be sufficient to implement the experiment
we described for a reasonable amount of input messages and see if there is an
output bit sequence that change with probability 1/2, while all other output
bit change with probability significantly different from 1/2.
4.2 Security against key recovery
In her paper, [7, page 17], Cook proves the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Cook). Given a fixed-length block cipher, E0, that works on L-
bit blocks and its elastic version, E1, that works on (L+ y)-bit blocks, where
0 ≤ y ≤ L, if there exists an attack, A1/E1, on E1 that allows the round
keys to be determined for r consecutive rounds of E1 using polynomial (in L
and r) time and memory, then there exists an attack on E0 with r cycles that
finds the expanded key for E0 and that uses polynomial (in L and r) many
resources as A1/E1, assuming there are no message-dependent expanded key,
meaning any expanded-key bits utilized in E0 depend only on the key and do
not vary across plaintext or ciphertext inputs.
We see Theorem5 as the base step of a proof by induction, and so we
prove the following. We now establish that En is secure against any key
recovery attack7 if so is E0.
Theorem 6 (Security Against Key Recovery). Given an elastic cipher, En−1
of level n− 1 (without initial and final whitening and key-dependent permu-
tation), working on 2n−1L-bit blocks and its elastic version, En, that works
on (2n−1L + y)-bit blocks, where 0 ≤ y ≤ 2n−1L, if there exists an at-
tack, An, on En that allows the round keys to be determined for r consec-
utive rounds of En using tAn operation, then there exists an attack An−1
on En−1 with r cycles that finds the expanded key for En−1 and that uses
tAn−1 < O(sr
2 + rtAn), assuming there are no message-dependent expanded
key, meaning any expanded-key bits utilized in En−1 depend only on the key
and do not vary across plaintext or ciphertext inputs. In particular, if An is
polynomial then An−1 is polynomial.
7In her paper, [7, page 17], Cook proves this theorem for an elastic cipher E1 applied
to E0 providing us the base step for our proof by induction.
14
Pi0 0...0
Cn−1,1 K
j′
Cn−1,1
Cn−1,r K
j′
Cn−1,r
Kj
′
W1
Kj
′
Wr
W1
⊕
Wr
⊕
Pi1 ?...?
vi1...viyPir
Figure 4: Keys used in En.
Proof. We show how the attack An can be converted to an attack to En−1
in polynomial time.
Suppose we want to find a set of cycles keys Kj = {KjCn−1,1 , ...,K
j
Cn−1,r
} that
encrypted the set of s messages P0 = {P00, ..., P0(s−1)} in the ciphertexts
Pr = {Pr0, ..., Pr(s−1)} using the elastic cipher En−1 working with blocks of
length 2n−1L.
First of all notice that we put an exponent j to K, because there may be
more than one set of cycle keys encrypting the same couples (P0i, Pri) for
i = 0, . . . , s− 1. One set is sufficient for us. To find the set of keys Kj build
an attack as follows.
Consider the sets: P ′0 = {P00‖0...0, ..., P0(s−1)‖0...0} and P
′
r = {Pr0‖v01...v0y , ...,
Pr(s−1)‖v(s−1)1...v(s−1)y}, where P00‖0...0 is the bit string P0i followed by y
zeros (we could choose any fixed string of y bits instead of all zeros), and
Pri‖vi1...viy is the bit string Pri followed by any string of y bits.
The elements of the sets P ′0 and P
′
r fit as input and output for a r-rounds
reduced elastic extension En of En−1.
So we can apply the attack An to the set of pairs (P0i‖0...0, Pri‖vi1...viy)
and obtain a set K′ of t sets Ki
′
(i = 1, . . . , t) of r round keys for En in
polynomial time in L and r. View this in Fig.4. From K′ we choose one
of the possible set of round keys, namely Kj
′
= {Kj
′
C1
‖Kj
′
W1
, ...,Kj
′
Cr
‖Kj
′
W1
}.
We can find KjCn−1,1 in the following way. The last operation in Cn−1,1 is a
whitening of 2n−1L bits. Call this key bit string Kj
Cn−1,1[0,...,2n−1L−1]
, then
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Figure 5: Round key conversion.
set:
Kj
Cn−1,1[0,...,2n−1L−1]
=
Kj
′
Cn−1,1[0,...,2n−1L−1]
⊕ (0‖...‖0‖Kj
′
W1 [2n−1L,...,2n−1L+y−1]
‖0‖...‖0) (8)
Where the number of zeros depends on the position in which the swap occur.
See Figure 5.
Once we got Kj
Cn−1,1[0,...,2n−1L−1]
we put the remaining bits of KjCn−1,1
equal to the remaining bits of Kj
′
Cn−1,1
, obtaining the desired cycle key
KjCn−1,1 . With this key we determine:
Pi1 = Cn−1,1(K
j
Cn−1,1
, Pi0) (9)
where Cn−1,1(K
j
Cn−1,1
, .) is the cycle function obtained using the cycle key
KjCn−1,1 .
Notice that we can sum the last y key bits of the whitening step because the
message to which they are xored is known (all zeros in our case); this is the
reason why we can not repeat the same trick with the next cycle key but we
have to restart a new attack as we are going to explain.
Now we repeat the process mounting the attack to a r − 1 round reduced
extension En of En−1, using the couples (P1i‖0...0, Pri‖vi1...viy) and we find
one by one the cycle keys KjCn−1,1 , with i = 2, . . . , r. The attack is done
applying An r times with s pairs of (plaintext, ciphertext) and running one
cycle of En−1 for each pair, for a total of sr application of Cn−1. If An
requires to know the output of each round of the reduced round version of
En, then
sr(r+1)
2 rounds of En have to be computed. If we call tAn the time to
run the attack, then the total number of operation required for the reduction
is O(sr2+ rtAn). In her theorem, Cook also considers the time to check that
an expanded key found by An adheres to the key schedule of E0. For us it
is not necessary since the key schedule of En−1 is a pseudorandom generator
and as such, any bit sequence must fit.
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